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ABSTRACT
Organizations are increasingly interested in allowing exter-
nal data scientists to explore their sensitive datasets. Due
to the popularity of differential privacy, data owners want
the data exploration to ensure provable privacy guarantees.
However, current systems for answering queries with differ-
ential privacy place an inordinate burden on the data analysts
to understand differential privacy, manage their privacy bud-
get, and even implement new algorithms for noisy query
answering. Moreover, current systems do not provide any
guarantees to the data analyst on the quality they care about,
namely accuracy of query answers.
We presentAPEx, a novel system that allows data analysts
to pose adaptively chosen sequences of queries along with
required accuracy bounds. By translating queries and accu-
racy bounds into differentially private algorithms with the
least privacy loss, APEx returns query answers to the data
analyst that meet the accuracy bounds, and proves to the
data owner that the entire data exploration process is differ-
entially private. Our comprehensive experimental study on
real datasets demonstrates that APEx can answer a variety
of queries accurately with moderate to small privacy loss,
and can support data exploration for entity resolution with
high accuracy under reasonable privacy settings.
KEYWORDS
Differential Privacy; Data Exploration
1 INTRODUCTION
Data exploration has been gaining more importance as large
and complex datasets are collected by organizations to en-
able data scientists to augment and to enrich their analysis.
These datasets are usually a mix of public data and private
sensitive data, and exploring them involves operations such
as profiling, summarization, building histograms on vari-
ous attributes, and top-k queries to better understand the
underlying semantics. Besides the large body of work on
interactive exploration on large data repositories [4], inter-
acting with large datasets can be an important step towards
many mundane jobs. For example, in entity matching tools
(such as Magellan [21], and Data Tamer [34]), a sequence of
exploration queries are needed to approximate the data dis-
tribution of various fields to pick the right matching model
parameters, features, etc. In data integration systems, explor-
ing the actual data instance of the sources plays a crucial
role in matching the different schemas.
In our interaction with many large enterprises, exploring
private data sets to enable large-scale data integration and
analytics projects is often a challenging task; while incor-
porating these data sources in the analysis carries a high
value, data owners often do not trust the analysts and hence,
require privacy guarantees. For instance, Facebook recently
announced that they would allow academics to analyze their
data to “study the role of social media in elections and democ-
racy", and one of the key concerns outlined was maintaining
the privacy of their customers’ data [19, 20].
Differential privacy [8, 10] has emerged as a popular pri-
vacy notion since (1) it is a persuasive mathematical guaran-
tee that individual records are hidden even when aggregate
statistics are revealed, (2) it ensures privacy even in the pres-
ence of side information about the data, and (3) it allows
one to bound the information leakage by a total privacy bud-
get across multiple data releases. Differential privacy has
seen adoption in a number of real products at the US Census
Bureau [14, 30, 35], Google [12], Apple [13] and Uber [18].
Hence, it is natural for data owners to aspire for systems that
permit differentially private data exploration.
1.1 The Challenge and The Problem
While there exist general purpose differentially private query
answering systems, they are not really meant to support in-
teractive querying, and they fall short in two key respects.
First, these systems place an inordinate burden on the data
analyst to understand differential privacy and differentially
private algorithms. For instance, PINQ [32] and wPINQ [33]
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allow users to write differentially private programs and en-
sure that every program expressed satisfies differential pri-
vacy. However, to achieve high accuracy, the analyst has to
be familiar with the privacy literature to understand how
the system adds noise and to identify if the desired accuracy
can be achieved in the first place. ϵktelo [37] has high level
operators that can be composed to create accurate differen-
tially private programs to answer counting queries. However,
the analyst still needs to know how to optimally apportion
privacy budgets across different operators. FLEX [18] allows
users to answer one SQL query under differential privacy, but
has the same issue of apportioning privacy budget across a
sequence of queries. Second, and somewhat ironically, these
systems do not provide any guarantees to the data analyst on
the quality they really care about, namely accuracy of query
answers. In fact, most of these systems take a privacy level
(ϵ) as input and make sure that differential privacy holds, but
leave accuracy unconstrained.
We aim to design a system that allows data analysts to
explore a sensitive dataset D held by a data owner by posing
a sequence of declaratively specified queries that can cap-
ture typical data exploration workflows. The system aims
at achieving the following dual goals: (1) since the data are
sensitive, the data owner would like the system to provably
bound the information disclosed about any one record in D
to the analyst; and (2) since privacy preserving mechanisms
introduce error, the data analyst must be able to specify an
accuracy bound on each query.
Hence, our goal is to design a system that can:
• Support declaratively specified aggregate queries that
capture a wide variety of data exploration tasks.
• Allow analysts to specify accuracy bounds on queries.
• Translate an analyst’s query into a differentially private
mechanism with minimal privacy loss ϵ such that it can
answer the query while meeting the accuracy bound.
• Prove that for any interactively specified sequence of
queries, the analyst’s view of the entire data exploration
process satisfies B-differential privacy, where B is a
owner specified privacy budget.
Our problem is similar in spirit to Ligett et al. [29], which
also considers analysts who specify accuracy constraints.
While their work focus on finding the smallest privacy cost
for a given differentially private mechanism and accuracy
bound, our focus is on a more general problem: for a given
query, find a mechanism and a minimal privacy cost to
achieve the given accuracy bound. We highlight the main
technical differences in Appendix D.
1.2 Contributions and Solution Overview
We propose APEx, an accuracy-aware privacy engine for
sensitive data exploration. APEx solves the aforementioned
challenges as follows:
• A data analyst can interact with the private data through
APEx using declaratively specified aggregate queries.
Our query language supports three types of aggregate
queries: (1) workload counting queries that capture the
large class of linear counting queries (e.g., histograms and
CDFs) which are a staple of statistical analysis, (2) iceberg
queries, which capture HAVING queries in SQL and fre-
quent pattern queries, and (3) top-k queries. These queries
form the building blocks of several data explorationwork-
flows. To demonstrate their applicability in real scenar-
ios, in Section 8, we express two important data cleaning
tasks, namely blocking and pair-wise matching, using
sequences of queries from our language.
• In our language, each query is associated with intuitive
accuracy bounds that permit APEx to use differentially
private mechanisms that introduce noise while meeting
the accuracy bound.
• For each query in a sequence,APEx employs an accuracy
translator that finds a privacy level ϵ and a differentially
private mechanism that answers the query while meet-
ing the specified accuracy bound. For the same privacy
level, the mechanism that answers a query with the least
error depends on the query and dataset. Hence,APEx im-
plements a suite of differentially private mechanisms for
each query type, and given an accuracy bound chooses
the mechanism that incurs the least privacy loss based
on the input query and dataset.
• APEx uses a privacy analyzer to decide whether or not to
answer a query such that the privacy loss to the analyst
is always bounded by a budget B. The privacy analysis
is novel since (1) the privacy loss of each mechanism is
chosen based on the query’s accuracy requirement, and
(2) some mechanisms have a data dependent privacy loss.
• In a comprehensive empirical evaluation on real datasets
with query and application benchmarks, we demonstrate
that (1) APEx chooses a differentially private mechanism
with the least privacy loss that answers an input query
under a specified accuracy bound, and (2) allows data an-
alysts to accurately explore data while ensuring provable
guarantee of privacy to data owners.
1.3 Organization
Section 2 introduces preliminaries and background. Section 3
describes our query language and accuracy measures. APEx
architecture is summarized in Section 4 and details of the
accuracy translator and the privacy analysis are described in
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Sections 5 and 6, respectively.APEx is comprehensively eval-
uated on real data using exploration queries in Section 7 and
on an entity resolution case study in Section 8. We conclude
with future work in Section 9.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
We consider the sensitive dataset in the form of a single-table
relational schema R(A1,A2, . . . ,Ad ), where attr (R) denotes
the set of attributes of R. Each attribute Ai has a domain
dom(Ai ). The full domain of R is dom(R) = dom(A1) × · · · ×
dom(Ad ), containing all possible tuples conforming to R. An
instance D of relation R is a multiset whose elements are
tuples in dom(R). We let the domain of the instances be D.
Extending our algorithms to schemas with multiple tables is
an interesting avenue for future work.
We use differential privacy as our measure of privacy. An
algorithm that takes as input a table D satisfies differential
privacy [9, 10] if its output does not significantly change by
adding or removing a single tuple in its input.
Definition 2.1 (ϵ-Differential Privacy [10]). A randomized
mechanismM : D → O satisfies ϵ-differential privacy if
Pr [M(D) ∈ O] ≤ eϵPr [M(D ′) ∈ O] (1)
for any set of outputs O ⊆ O, and any pair of neighboring
databases D,D ′ such that |D\D ′ ∪ D ′\D | = 1.
Smaller values of ϵ result in stronger privacy guarantees as
D and D ′ are harder to distinguish using the output. Compo-
sition and postprocessing theorems of differential privacy are
described in Appendix B and will be used to bound privacy
across multiple data releases in Section 6.
3 QUERIES AND ACCURACY
In this section, we describe our query language for expressing
aggregate queries and the associated accuracy measures.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the schema and the
full domain of attributes are public.
3.1 Exploration Queries
APEx supports a rich class of aggregate queries that can be
expressed in a SQL-like declarative format.
BIN D ON f (·) WHERE W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}
[HAVING f (·) > c ]
[ORDER BY f (·) LIMIT k ] ;
Each query in our language is associated with a workload
of predicates W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}. Based on W , the tuples
in a table D are divided into bins. Each bin bi contains all
the tuples in D that satisfy the corresponding predicate ϕi :
dom(R) → {0, 1}, i.e., bi = {r ∈ D |ϕ(r ) = 1}. As we will
see later, bins need not be disjoint. Moreover, a query has
an aggregation function f : dom(R)∗ → R, which returns
a numeric answer f (bi ) for each bin bi . The output of this
query without the optional clauses (in square brackets) is a
list of counts f (bi ) for bin bi .
Each query can be specialized using one of two optional
clauses: the HAVING clause returns a list of bin identifiers
bi for which f (bi ) > c; and the ORDER BY ... LIMIT clause
returns the k bins that have the largest values for f (bi ).
Throughout this paper, we focus on COUNT as the aggre-
gate function and discuss other aggregates like AVG, SUM,
QUANTILE in Appendix E.
Workload Counting Query (WCQ).
BIN D ON f (·) WHERE W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL};
Workload counting queries capture the large class of linear
counting queries, which are the bread and butter of statistical
analysis and have been the focus of majority of the work
in differential privacy [16, 27]. Standard SELECT...GROUP
BY queries in SQL are expressible using WCQ. For instance,
consider a table D having an attribute State with domain
{AL, AK, . . . , WI, WY} and an attribute Aдe with domain
[0,∞). Then, a query that returns the number of people with
age above 50 for each state can be expressed using WCQ as:
BIN D ON COUNT ( ∗ )
WHERE W = {Aдe>50∧State=AL, ...,Aдe>50∧State=WY} ;
Other common queries captured by WCQ include: (1)
histogram queries: the workloadW partitions D into |Wh |
disjoint bins, e.g. Wh = {0 < Aдe ≤ 10, 10 < Aдe ≤
20, . . . , 90 < Aдe} the resulting WCQ returns counts for
each bin; (2) cumulative histograms: we can define a work-
loadWp that places tuples in D into a set of inclusive bins
b1 ⊆ b2 · · · ⊆ bL , e.g.Wp = {Aдe ≤ 10,Aдe ≤ 20, . . . ,Aдe ≤
90}. The resulting query outputs a set of cumulative counts.
We call such aWp a prefix workload.
Iceberg Counting Query (ICQ).
BIN D ON COUNT ( ∗ ) WHERE W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}
HAVING COUNT ( ∗ ) > c ;
An iceberg query returns bin identifiers if the aggregate
value for that bin is greater than a given threshold c . For
instance, a query which returns the states in the US with a
population of at least 5 million can be expressed as:
BIN D ON COUNT ( ∗ ) WHERE W = {State=AL,...,State=WY}
HAVING COUNT( ∗ ) > 5 million ;
Note that since the answer to the query is a subset of
the predicates inW (i.e. a subset of bin identifiers but not
the aggregate values for these bins, an ICQ is not a linear
counting query.
Top-k Counting Query (TCQ).
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BIN D ON COUNT ( ∗ ) WHERE W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}
ORDER BY COUNT ( ∗ ) LIMIT k ;
TCQ first sorts the bins based on their aggregate values
(in descending order) and returns the top k bins identifiers
(and not the aggregate values). For example, a query which
returns the three US states with highest population can be
expressed as:
BIN D ON COUNT ( ∗ ) WHERE W = {State=AL,...,State=WY}
ORDER BY COUNT ( ∗ ) LIMIT k ;
3.2 Accuracy Measure
To ensure differential privacy, the answers to the exploration
queries are typically noisy. To allow the data analyst to ex-
plore data with bounded error, we extend our queries to
incorporate an accuracy requirement. The syntax for accu-
racy is inspired by that in BlinkDB [3]:
BIN D ON f (·) WHERE W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}
[HAVING f (·) > c ]
[ORDER BY f (·) LIMIT k ]
ERROR α CONFIDENCE 1 − β ;
We next define the semantics of the accuracy requirement
for each of our query types. The accuracy requirement for a
WCQ qW is defined as a bound on the maximum error across
queries in the workloadW .
Definition 3.1 ((α , β)-WCQ accuracy). Given a workload
counting query qW : D → RL , whereW = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}.
Let M : D → RL be a mechanism that outputs a vector
of answers y on D. Then, M satisfies (α , β)-W accuracy, if
∀D ∈ D,
Pr[∥y − qW (D)∥∞ ≥ α] ≤ β , (2)
where ∥y − qW (D)∥∞ = maxj |y[i] − cϕi (D)|.
The output of iceberg counting queries ICQ and top-k
counting queries TCQ are not numeric, but a subset of the
given workload predicates. Their accuracy measures are dif-
ferent from WCQ, and depend on their corresponding work-
load counting query qW .
Definition 3.2 ((α , β)-ICQ accuracy). Given an iceberg
counting query qW ,>c : D → O , whereW = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL},
and O is a power set ofW . Let M : D → O be a mecha-
nism that outputs a subset ofW . Then,M satisfies (α , β)-ICQ
accuracy for qW ,>c if for D,
Pr[|{ϕ ∈ M(D) | cϕ (D) < c − α }| > 0] ≤ β (3)
Pr[|{ϕ ∈ (W −M(D)) | cϕ (D) > c + α }| > 0] ≤ β (4)
A mechanism for ICQ can make two kinds of errors: label
predicates with true counts greater than c as < c (red dots in
Figure 1) and label predicates with true counts less than c as >
!
$ICQ
Wrongly labeled 
as smaller than c
Wrongly labeled 
as larger than c
No error above ! + $ with high 
probability 1 − (No error below ! − $ with high probability 1 − (
!"
$
TCQ
Wrongly excluded 
from  top-k
Wrongly included 
into top-k
No error below !" − $ with 
high probability 1 − ( No error above !" + $ with high probability 1 − (
Figure 1: Accuracy Requirement for ICQ and TCQ
c (blue dots in Figure 1). We say a mechanism satisfies (α , β)-
ICQ accuracy if with high probability, all the predicates with
true counts greater than c + α are correctly labeled as > c
and all the predicates with true counts less than c − α are
correctly labeled as < c . The mechanism may make arbitrary
mistakes within the range [c − α , c + α].
Definition 3.3 ((α , β)-TCQ accuracy). Given a top-k count-
ing query qW ,k : D → O , whereW = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}, and O
is a power set ofW . Let M : D → O be a mechanism that
outputs a subset ofW . Then,M satisfies (α , β)-TCQ accuracy
if for D ∈ D,
Pr[|{ϕ ∈ M(D) | cϕ (D) < ck − α }| > 0] ≤ β (5)
Pr[|{ϕ ∈ (Φ −M(D)) | cϕ (D) > ck + α }| > 0] ≤ β (6)
where ck is the kth largest counting value among all the bins,
and Φ is the true top-k bins.
The intuition behind Definition 3.3 is similar to that of ICQ
and is explained in Figure 1: predicates with count greater
than ck + α are included and predicates with count less than
ck − α do not enter the top-k with high probability.
In the rest of the paper, we will describe howAPEx designs
differentially private mechanisms to answer queries with
the above defined bounds on accuracy. The advantages of
our accuracy definitions are that they are intuitive (when α
increases, noisier answers are expected) and we can design
privacy-preserving mechanisms that introduce noise while
satisfying these accuracy guarantees. On the other hand,
this measure is not equivalent to other bounds on accuracy
like relative error and precision/recall which can be very
sensitive to small amounts of noise (when the counts are
small, or when lie within a small range). For instance, if the
counts of all the predicates in ICQ lie outside [c − α , c + α],
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Algorithm 1 APEx Overview
Require: Dataset D, privacy budget B
1: Initialize privacy loss B0 ← 0, index i ← 1
2: repeat
3: Receive (qi ,αi , βi ) from analyst
4: M ← mechanisms applicable to qi ’s type
5: M∗ ← {M ∈ M | M .translate(qi ,αi , βi ).ϵu ≤ B−Bi−1}
6: if M∗ , ∅ then
7: // Pessimistic Mode
8: Mi ← argminM ∈M∗ M .translate(qi ,αi , βi ).ϵu
9: // Optimistic Mode
10: Mi ← argminM ∈M∗ M .translate(qi ,αi , βi ).ϵl
11: (ωi , ϵi ) ← Mi .run(qi ,αi , βi ,D)
12: Bi ← Bi−1 + ϵi , i++
13: return ωi
14: else
15: Bi = Bi−1, i++
16: return ‘Query Denied’
17: end if
18: until No more queries sent by local exploration
a mechanism M that perturbs counts within ±α and then
answers an ICQ will have precision and recall of 1.0 with
high probability as it makes no mistakes. However, if all the
query answers lie within [c − α , c + α], then the precision
and recall of the output ofM could be 0. Incorporating other
error measures like precision/recall and relative error into
APEx is an interesting avenue for future work.
4 APEX OVERVIEW
This section outlines how APEx translates analyst queries
with accuracy bounds into differentially private mechanisms,
and how it ensures the privacy budget B specified by the
data owner is not violated.
Accuracy Translator. Given an analyst’s query (q,α , β),
APEx first uses the accuracy translator to choose a mech-
anism M that can (1) answer q under the specified accu-
racy bounds, with (2) minimal privacy loss. To achieve these,
APEx supports a set of differentially private mechanisms that
can be used to answer each query type (WCQ, ICQ, TCQ).
Multiple mechanisms are supported for each query type as
different mechanisms result in the least privacy loss depend-
ing on the query and the dataset (as shown theoretically and
empirically in Sections 5 and 7, respectively).
Each mechanismM exposes two functions:M .translate,
which translates a query and accuracy requirement into a
lower and upper bound (ϵ l , ϵu ) on the privacy loss if M is
executed, andM .run that runs the differentially private al-
gorithm and returns an approximate answer ω for the query.
The answer ω is guaranteed to satisfy the specified accuracy
requirement. Moreover, M satisfies ϵu differential privacy.
The mechanisms supported by APEx and the correspond-
ing translate functions are described in Section 5. In some
cases (e.g. Algorithm 4 in Section 5.3.2), the privacy loss
incurred by M may be ϵ ∈ (ϵ l , ϵu ) that is smaller than the
worst case, depending on the characteristics of the dataset.
As described in Algorithm 1,APEx first identifies themech-
anismsM that are applicable for the type of the query qi
(Line 4). Next, it runsM .translate to get conservative esti-
mates on privacy loss ϵu for all these mechanisms (Line 5).
APEx picks one of the mechanisms M from those that can
be safely run using the remaining privacy budget, executes
M .run, and returns the output to the analyst. As we will
see there exist mechanisms where the privacy loss can vary
based on the data in a range between [ϵ l , ϵu ], and the ac-
tual privacy loss is unknown before running the mechanism.
In such cases, APEx can choose to be pessimistic and pick
the mechanism with the least ϵu (Line 8), or choose to be
optimistic and pick the mechanism with the least ϵ l (Line 10).
Privacy Analyzer. Given a sequence of queries
(M1, . . . ,Mi ) already executed by the privacy engine
that satisfy an overall Bi−1-differential privacy and a new
query (qi ,αi , βi ), APEx identifies a set of mechanisms
M∗ that all will have a worst case privacy loss smaller
than B − Bi−1 (Line 5). That is, running any mechanism
in M∗ will not result in exceeding the privacy budget
in the worst case. If M∗ = ∅, then APEx returns ‘Query
Denied’ to the analyst (Line 16). Otherwise, APEx runs one
of the mechanisms Mi from M∗ by executing Mi .run()
and the output ωi will be returned to the analyst. APEx
then increments Bi−1 by the actual privacy loss ϵi rather
than the upperbound ϵu (Line 12). As explained above,
in some cases ϵi < ϵu as different execution paths in the
mechanism can have different privacy loss. Nevertheless,
the privacy analyzer guarantees that the execution of any
sequence of mechanisms (M1,M2, . . . ,Mi ) before it halts is
B-differentially private (see Section 6, Theorem 6.2).
5 ACCURACY TRANSLATOR
In this section, we present the accuracy-to-privacy transla-
tion mechanisms supported by APEx and the corresponding
run and translate functions. We first present a general
baseline mechanism for all three types of exploration queries
including workload counting query (WCQ), iceberg count-
ing query (ICQ), and top-k counting query (TCQ). Then we
show specialized mechanisms for each type of exploration
queries which consumes smaller privacy cost under different
scenarios than the baseline.
We represent the workload in these three queries in a ma-
trix form, like the prior work for WCQ [26, 27, 31]. There
are many possible ways to transform a workload into a ma-
trix. Given a query with L predicates, the number of domain
5
partitions can be as large as 2L . In this work, we consider
the following transformation to reduce complexity. Given
a workload counting query qW with the set of predicates
W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}, the full domain of the relation dom(R) is
partitioned based onW to form the new discretized domain
domW (R) such that any predicate ϕi ∈W can be expressed
as a union of partitions in the new domain domW (R) and
the number of partitions is minimized. For example, given
W = {Aдe > 50∧State = AL, . . . ,Aдe > 50∧State = WY},
one possible partition is domW (R) = {Aдe > 50 ∧ State =
AL, . . . ,Aдe > 50 ∧ State = WY,Aдe ≤ 50}.
Let x represent the histogram of the tableD overdomW (R).
The set of corresponding counting queries {cϕ1 , . . . , cϕL } for
qW can be represented by a matrix W = [w1, . . . ,wL]T of
size L×|domW (R)|. Hence, the answer to each counting query
is cϕi (D) = wi · x and the answer to the workload counting
query is simplyWx. We denote and use this transformation
byW← T(W ), x← TW (D) throughout this paper. Unlike
prior work [26, 27, 31] which aims to bound the expected
total error for one query, APEx aims to bound the maximum
error per query with high probability which is more intuitive
in the process of data exploration.
5.1 Baseline Translation
The baseline translation for all three query types is based
on the Laplace mechanism [9, 10], a classic and widely used
differentially private algorithm, which can be used for WCQ,
ICQ, and TCQ. Formally,
Definition 5.1 (Laplace Mechanism (Vector Form)[9, 10]).
Given an L × |domW (R)| query matrix W, the random-
ized algorithm LM that outputs the following vector is ϵ-
differentially private: LM(W, x) = Wx + Lap(bW)L where
bW =
∥W∥1
ϵ , and Lap(b)L denote a vector of L independent
samples ηi from a Laplace distribution with mean 0 and
variance 2b2, i.e., Pr[ηi = z] ∝ e−z/b for i = 1, . . . ,L.
The constant ∥W∥1 is equal to the sensitivity of queries
set defined by the workloadW [26, 27]. It measures the max-
imum difference in the answers to the queries inW on any
two databases that differ only a single record. Mathemati-
cally, it is the maximum of L1 norm of a column ofW.
Algorithm 2 provides the run and translate of Laplace
mechanism for all three query types. This algorithm first
transforms the query qW and the data D into matrix rep-
resentation W and x. The translate outputs a lower and
upper bound (ϵ l , ϵu ) for each query type with a given ac-
curacy requirement and these two bounds are the same as
Laplace mechanism is data independent. However, these
bounds vary among query types. The run takes the pri-
vacy budget computed by translate(q,α , β) (Line 3) and
adds the corresponding Laplace noise [x˜1, . . . , x˜L] to the true
workload counts Wx. When q is a WCQ, the noisy counts
Algorithm 2 Laplace Mechanism (LM) (q,α , β ,D)
1: InitializeW← T(W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}), x← TW (D),α , β
2: function run(q,α , β ,D)
3: ϵ ← translate(qW ,α , β).ϵu
4: [x˜1, . . . , x˜L] ←Wx + Lap(b)L , where b = ∥W∥1/ϵ
5: if q.type==WCQ (i.e., qW ) then
6: return ([x˜1, . . . , x˜L], ϵ)
7: else if q.type==ICQ (i.e., qW ,>c ) then
8: return ({ϕi ∈W | x˜i > c}, ϵ)
9: else if q.type==TCQ (i.e., qW ,k ) then
10: return (argmaxkϕ1, ...,ϕL x˜i , ϵ)
11: end if
12: end function
13: function translate(q,α , β)
14: if q.type==WCQ (i.e., qW ) then
15: return (ϵu = ∥W∥1 ln(1/(1−(1−β )1/L ))α , ϵl = ϵu )
16: else if q.type==ICQ (i.e., qW ,>c ) then
17: return (ϵu = ∥W∥1(ln(1/(1−(1−β )1/L ))−ln 2)α , ϵl = ϵu )
18: else if q.type==TCQ (i.e., qW ,k ) then
19: return (ϵu = ∥W∥12(ln(L/(2β )))α , ϵl = ϵu )
20: end if
21: end function
are returned directly; when q is an ICQ, the bin ids (the
predicates) that have noisy counts ≥ c are returned; when
q is a TCQ, the bin ids (the predicates) that have the largest
k noisy counts are returned. Beside the noisy output, the
privacy budget consumed by this mechanism is returned as
well. The following theorem summarizes the properties of
the two functions run and translate.
Theorem 5.2. Given a query q where q.type
∈ {WCQ, ICQ,TCQ}, Laplace mechanism (Algorithm 2)
denoted by M can achieve (α , β)-q.type accuracy by
executing the function run(q,α , β ,D) for any D ∈ D,
and satisfy differential privacy with a minimal cost of
translate(q,α , β).ϵu .
The accuracy and privacy proof is mainly based on the
noise property of Laplace mechanism. Refer to Appendix A.1
for the detailed proof.
5.2 Special Translation for WCQ
The privacy cost of the Laplace mechanism increases linearly
with ∥W∥1, the sensitivity of the workload in the query. For
example, a prefix workload has a sensitivity equals to the
workload size L. When L is very large, the privacy cost grows
drastically. To address this problem, APEx provides a special
translation for WCQ, called strategy-based mechanism. This
mechanism considers a different strategy workload A such
that (i) A has a low sensitivity ∥A∥1, and (ii) rows inW can
be reconstructed using a small number of rows in A.
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Algorithm 3WCQ-SM (qW ,α , β ,D,A)
1: InitializeW← T(W ), x← TW (D),α , β,A
2: function run(qW ,α , β ,D)
3: ϵ ← translate(W,α , β).ϵu
4: ω ←WA+(Ax + Lap(b)l ), where b = ∥A∥1/ϵ
5: return (ω, ϵ)
6: end function
7: function translate(qW ,α , β)
8: Set u = ∥A∥1 ∥WA
+ ∥F
α
√
β/2 and l = 0
9: ϵ = binarySearch(l ,u, estimateBeta(·,α , β ,WA+))
10: return (ϵu = ϵ, ϵl = ϵ)
11: end function
12: function estimateBeta(ϵ,α , β ,WA+)
13: Sample size N = 10000 and failure counter nf = 0
14: for i ∈ [1, . . . ,N ] do
15: Sample noise ηi ∼ Lap(∥A∥1/ϵ)l
16: if ∥(WA+)ηi ∥∞ > α then
17: nf ++
18: end if
19: end for
20: βe = nf /N , p = β/100
21: δβ = z1−p/2
√
βe (1 − βe )/N
22: return (βe + δβ + p/2) < β
23: end function
Let strategy matrix A be a l × |domW (R)| matrix, and A+
denote its Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse, such thatWAA+ =
W. Given such a strategy workload A, we can first an-
swer A using Laplace mechanism, i.e. yˆ = Ax + η, where
η ∼ Lap(b)l and b = ∥A∥1ϵ , and then reconstruct answers to
W from the noisy answers to A (as a postprocessing step),
i.e. (WA+)yˆ. This approach is formally known as the Matrix
mechanism [26, 27] and shown in the run of Algorithm 3.
If a strategy A is used for this mechanism, we denote it by
A-strategymechanism. In this work, we consider several pop-
ular strategies in prior work [26, 27, 31], such as hierarchical
matrix H2. Techniques like HDMM [31] can automatically
solve for a good strategy (but this is not our focus).
However, translating the accuracy requirement on WCQ-
SM is nontrivial as the answers to the query qW (D) are linear
combinations of noisy answers. The errors are due to the
sums of weighted Laplace random variables which have non-
trivial CDFs for the accuracy translation. Hence, we propose
an accuracy to privacy translation method shown in the
translate function of Algorithm 3. We first set an upper
bound u for the privacy to achieve (α , β)-WCQ accuracy
based on Theorem A.1 (Appendix A.2) and conduct a binary
search on a privacy cost ϵ between l and u (Line 9) such
that the failing probability to bound the error by α equals
to β . During this binary search, for each ϵ between l and
u, we run Monte Carlo simulation to learn the empirical
failing rate βe to bound the error by α shown in the Function
estimateBeta() such that with high confidence 1 − p, the
true failing probability βt lies within βe ±δβ . If the empirical
failing rate βe is sufficiently smaller than β , then the upper
bound is set to ϵ ; otherwise the lower bound is set to ϵ . The
next value for ϵ is (l +u)/2. This search process stops when l
and u is sufficiently small. This approach can be generalized
to all data-independent differentially private mechanisms.
The simulation can be done offline.
Theorem 5.3. Given a workload counting queryqW : D →
RL . Answering qW with A-strategy mechanism by executing
run(qW ,α , β ,D) in Algorithm 3 achieves (α , β)-WCQ accu-
racy for any D ∈ D with an approximated minimal privacy
cost of translate(qW ,α , β).ϵu .
Refer to Appendix A.2 for the proof. In the future work,
we can add similar optimizers like HDMM [31] which finds
the optimal strategy efficiently for a given query.
5.3 Special Translation for ICQ
The strategy-based mechanism that we used for WCQ can
be adapted to answer ICQ if used in conjunction with a post-
processing step (Section 5.3.1). We also present another novel
data dependent translation strategy for ICQ that may result
in different privacy loss for different datasets given the same
accuracy requirement (Section 5.3.2).
5.3.1 Strategy-based Mechanism (ICQ-SM). The analyst can
pose a workload counting query qW with (α , β)-WCQ re-
quirement via APEx, and then use the noisy answer of
qW (D) to learn qW ,>c (D) locally. This corresponds to a post-
processing step of a differentially private mechanism and
hence still ensures the same level of differential privacy guar-
antee (Theorem B.2). On the other hand, (α , β)-ICQ accuracy
only requires to bound one-sided noise by α with probability
(1 − β), and (α , β)-WCQ accuracy requires to bound two-
sided noise with the same probability. Hence, if a mechanism
has a failing probability of β to bound the error for WCQ,
then using the same mechanism has a failing probability of
β/2 to bound the error for ICQ.
5.3.2 Multi-Poking Mechanism (ICQ-MPM). We propose a
data-dependent translation for ICQ, which can be used as
a subroutine for mechanisms that involve threshold testing.
For ease of explanation, we will illustrate this translation
with a special case of ICQ when the workload size L = 1,
denoted by, qϕ,>c (·). Intuitively, when cϕ (D) is much larger
(or smaller) than c , then a much larger (smaller resp.) noise
can be added to cϕ (D) without changing the output of APEx.
Consider the following example.
Example 5.4. Consider a query qϕ,>c , where c = 100. To
achieve (α , β) accuracy for this query, where α = 10, β =
0.110, the Laplace mechanism requires a privacy cost of
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α = 2.23 by Theorem 5.2, regardless of input D. Sup-
pose cϕ (D) = 1000. In this case, cϕ (D) is much larger than
the threshold c , and the difference is (1000−100)α = 90 times
of the accuracy bound α = 10. Hence, even when applying
Laplace comparison mechanism with a privacy cost equals to
2.23
90 ≈ 0.25 wherein the noise added is bounded by 90α with
high probability 1 − β , the noisy difference cϕ (D) − c + ηsiдn
will still be greater than 0 with high probability.
This is an example where a different mechanism rather
than Laplace mechanism achieves the same accuracy with a
smaller privacy cost. Note that the tightening of the privacy
cost in this example requires to know the value of cϕ (D). It
is difficult to determine a privacy budget for poking with-
out looking at the query answer. To tackle this challenge,
we propose an alternative approach that allows ofm pokes
with increasing privacy cost. This approach is summarized
in Algorithm 4 as Multi-Poking Mechanism (MPM). This
approach first computes the privacy cost if allm pokes are
needed, ϵmax = ln(m/(2β ))α . The first poke checks if bins have
either sufficiently large noisy differences y˜ with respect to
the accuracy α0 for the current privacy cost (Lines 8-10). If
this is true (Lines 10), then the set of predicates with suffi-
ciently large positive differences is returned; otherwise, the
privacy budget is relaxed with additional ϵmax/m. At (i+1)th
iteration, instead of sampling independent noise, we apply
the RelaxPrivacy Algorithm (details refer to [22]) to cor-
relate the new noise ηi+1 with noise ηi from the previous
iteration. In this way, the privacy loss of the first i + 1 iter-
ations is ϵi+1, and the noise added in the i + 1th iteration
is equivalent to a noise generated with Laplace distribution
with privacy parameter b = (1/ϵi+1). This approach allows
the data analyst to learn the query answer with a gradual
relaxation of privacy cost. This process repeats until all ϵmax
is spent. We show that Algorithm 4 achieves both accuracy
and privacy requirements.
Theorem 5.5. Given a query qW ,>c , Multi-Poking Mecha-
nism (Algorithm 4), achieves (α , β)-ICQ accuracy by execut-
ing function run(qW ,>c ,α , β,D), with differential privacy of
translate(qW ,>c ,α , β).ϵu .
Refer to Appendix A.3 for proof. The privacy loss of multi-
poking mechanism at the worst case (the value returned by
translate) is greater than that of the baseline LM, but this
mechanism may stop before ϵmax is used up, and hence it
potentially saves privacy budget for the subsequent queries.
5.4 Special Translation for TCQ
This section provides a translation mechanism, known as
Laplace top-k Mechanism (shown in Algorithm 5). This mech-
anism is a generalized report-noisy-max algorithm [10]: when
k = 1, it adds noise drawn from Lap(1/ϵ) to all queries, and
Algorithm 4 ICQ-MPM(qW ,>c ,α , β,D,m)
1: InitializeW← T(W ), x← TW (D),α , β,m = 10
2: function run(qW ,>c ,α , β,D)
3: Compute ϵmax = translate(qW ,>c ,α , β).ϵu
4: Initial privacy cost ϵ0 = ϵmax/m
5: y˜0 = Wx − c + η0, where η0 ∼ Lap(∥W∥1/ϵ0)L
6: for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 2 do
7: Set αi = ∥W∥1 ln(mL/(2β))/ϵi
8: W+ ← {ϕ j ∈W | (y˜i [j] − αi )/α ≥ −1}
9: W− ← {ϕ j ∈W | (y˜i [j] + αi )/α ≤ 1}
10: if (W+ ∪W−) =W then
11: return (W+, ϵi )
12: else
13: Increase privacy budget ϵi+1 = ϵi + ϵmax/m
14: for j = 1, . . . ,L do
15: ηi+1[j] = RelaxPrivacy(ηi [j], ϵi , ϵi+1) [22]
16: end for
17: New noisy difference y˜i+1 = Wx − c + ηi+1
18: end if
19: end for
20: return ({ϕ j ∈W | y˜m−1[j] > 0}, ϵmax)
21: end function
22: function translate(qW ,>c ,α , β)
23: return ϵu = ∥W∥1 ln(mL/(2β ))α , ϵl =
ϵu
m
24: end function
only reports the query number that has the maximum noisy
count (and not the noisy count). When k ≥ 1, this mech-
anism first perturbs Wx with Laplace noise η ∼ Lap(b)L ,
where b = k/ϵ . These predicates are then sorted based on
their corresponding noisy counts in descending order, and
the first k boolean formulae are outputted. The privacy cost
is summarized in Theorem 5.6 and the proof follows that of
the report-noisy-max algorithm as shown in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 5.6. Given a top-k counting query qW ,k (·), where
W = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕL}, for a table D ∈ D, Laplace top-k mecha-
nism (Algorithm 5) denoted by LTMα,βW ,k (·), can achieve (α , β)-
TCQ accuracy by executing run(qW ,k ,α , β,D) with minimal
differential privacy cost of translate(qW ,k ,α , β).ϵu .
Note that the privacy proof of the report-noisy-max algo-
rithm does not work for releasing both the noisy count and
the query number simultaneously. Hence we consider only
releasing the bin identifiers in Algorithm 5. Moreover, the
privacy cost of Algorithm 5 is independent of the workload
∥W ∥1. On the other hand, the baseline LM (Algorithm 2)
for answering TCQ queries is different from Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 2 uses noise drawn from Lap(∥W ∥1/ϵ) to release
noisy counts for all queries, and then picks the top-k as a
post-processing step. Algorithm 2 allows the noisy counts
to be shown to the analyst without hurting the privacy cost.
Hence, Algorithm 2 has a simpler privacy proof than Algo-
rithm 5 and a privacy loss that depends on the workload.
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Algorithm 5 TCQ-LTM(qW ,k ,α , β ,D))
1: InitializeW← T(W ), x← TW (D),α , β
2: function run(qW ,k ,α , β,D)
3: ϵ ← translate(qW ,k ,α , β).ϵu
4: (x˜1, . . . , x˜L) = Wx + Lap(b)L , where b = k/ϵ
5: (i1, . . . , ik ) = argmaxki=1, ...,Lx˜i
6: return ({ϕi1 , . . . ,ϕik }, ϵ)
7: end function
8: function translate(qW ,k ,α , β)
9: return ϵu = 2k ln(L/(2β ))α , ϵl = ϵu
10: end function
APEx supports both Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 5 as there is
no clear winner between them when k > 1. APEx chooses
the one with the least epsilon for a given accuracy bound.
6 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The privacy analyzer ensures that every sequence of queries
answered by APEx results in a B-differentially private exe-
cution, where B is the data owner specified privacy budget.
The formal proof of privacy primarily follows from the well
known composition theorems (described for completeness
in Appendix B). According to sequential composition (The-
orem B.1), the privacy loss of a set of differentially private
mechanisms (that use independent random coins) is the sum
of the privacy losses of each of these mechanisms. More-
over, postprocessing the outputs of a differentially private
algorithm does not degrade privacy (Theorem B.2).
The main tricky (and novel) part of the privacy proof (de-
scribed in Section 6.1) arises due to the fact that (1) the ϵ
parameter for a mechanism is chosen based on the analyst’s
query and accuracy requirement, which in turn are adap-
tively chosen by the analyst based on previous queries and
answers, and (2) some mechanisms may have an actual pri-
vacy loss that is dependent on the data. APEx accounts for
privacy based on the actual privacy loss (and not the worst
case privacy loss (see Line 12, Algorithm 1).
6.1 Overall Privacy Guarantee
We show the following guarantee: any sequence of in-
teractions between the data analyst and APEx satisfies B-
differential privacy, where B is the privacy budget specified
by the data owner. In order to state this guarantee formally,
we first need the notion of a transcript of interaction between
APEx and the data analyst.
We define the transcript of interaction T as an alternating
sequence of queries (with accuracy requirements) posed to
APEx and answers returned byAPEx. T encodes the analyst’s
view of the private database. More formally,
• The transcript Ti after i interactions is a sequence
[(q1,α1, β1), (ω1, ϵ1), . . . , (qi ,αi , βi ), (ωi , ϵi )], where
(qi ,αi , βi ) are queries with accuracy requirements, and
ωi is the answer returned by APEx and ϵi the actual
privacy loss.
• Given Ti−1, analyst chooses the next query
(qi+1,αi+1, βi+1) adaptively. We model this using a
(possibly randomized) algorithm C that maps a tran-
script Ti−1 to (qi ,αi , βi ); i.e., C(Ti−1) = (qi ,αi , βi ). Note
that the analyst’s algorithm C does not access the private
database D.
• Given (qi ,αi , βi ), APEx select a subset of mechanisms
M∗ such that ∀M ∈ M∗, M .translate(qi ,αi , βi ).ϵu ≤
B − Bi . Furthermore, ifM∗ is not empty, APEx chooses
one mechanismMi ∈ M∗ deterministically (either based
on ϵ l or ϵu ) to run. The selection ofMi is deterministic
and independent of D.
• If APEx find no mechanism to run (M∗ = ∅), then the
query is declined byAPEx. In this case,ωi = ⊥ and ϵi = 0.
• If the APEx chosen algorithmMi is LM, WCQ-SM, ICQ-
SM or TCQ-LTM, ϵi = ϵui , where ϵi is the upperbound
on the privacy loss returned byMi .translate. For ICQ-
MPM, the actual privacy loss can be smaller; i.e., ϵi ≤ ϵui .
• Let Pr [Ti |D] denote the probability that the transcript of
interaction is Ti given input database D. The probability
is over the randomness in the analyst’s choices C and
the randomness in the mechanismsM1, . . . ,Mi executed
by APEx.
Not all transcripts of interactions are realizable under
APEx. Given a privacy budget B, the set of valid transcripts
is defined as:
Definition 6.1 (Valid Transcripts). A transcript of interac-
tion Ti is a valid APEx transcript generated by Algorithm 1
if given a privacy budget B the following conditions hold:
• Bi−1 = ∑i−1j=1 ϵj ≤ B, and
• Either ωi = ⊥, or Bi−1 + ϵui ≤ B.
We are now ready to state the privacy guarantee:
Theorem 6.2 (APEx Privacy Guarantee). Given a pri-
vacy budget B, any valid APEx transcript Ti , and any pair of
databasesD,D ′ that differ in one row (i.e., |D\D ′∪D ′\D | = 1),
we have:
(1) Bi =
∑i
j=1 ϵi ≤ B, and
(2) Pr [Ti |D] ≤ eBiPr [Ti |D ′].
Proof. (1) directly follows from the definition of a valid
transcript and these are the only kinds of transcripts an
analyst sees when interacting with APEx.
(2) can be shown as follows using induction.
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Base Case: When the transcript is empty, Pr [∅|D] ≤
e0Pr [∅|D ′].
Induction step: Now suppose for all Ti−1 of that encode
valid APEx transcripts of length i − 1, Pr [Ti−1 |D] ≤
eBi−1Pr [Ti−1 |D ′]. Let Ti = Ti−1 | |[(qi ,αi , βi ), (ωi , ϵi )] be a
valid APEx transcript of length i . Then:
Pr [Ti |D] = Pr [Ti−1 |D]Pr [[(qi ,αi , βi ), (ωi , ϵi )]|D,Ti−1]
= Pr [Ti−1 |D]Pr [C(Ti−1) = (qi ,αi , βi )]Pr [Mi (D) = (ωi , ϵi )]
Note that the analyst’s choice of query qi and accuracy re-
quirement depends only on the transcript Ti−1 and not the
sensitive database, and thus incurs no privacy loss (from
Theorem B.2). Thus, it is enough to show that
Pr [Mi (D) = (ωi , ϵi )] ≤ eϵiPr [Mi (D ′) = (ωi , ϵi )]
Case 1: When ωi , ⊥ and Mi is LM, WCQ-SM, ICQ-SM,
or TCQ-LTM, the mechanism satisfies ϵui -DP and ϵi = ϵui .
Therefore, Pr [Mi (D) = (ωi , ϵi )] ≤ eϵiPr [Mi (D ′) = (ωi , ϵi )].
Case 2: When ωi , ⊥ andMi is ICQ-MPM, the mechanism
satisfies ϵui -DP across all outputs. However, when either
mechanism outputs (ωi , ϵi ), for ϵi < ϵui , we can show that
Pr [Mi (D) = (ωi , ϵi )] ≤ eϵiPr [Mi (D ′) = (ωi , ϵi )]. In the case
of ICQ-MPM, if the algorithm returns in Line 11 after i it-
erations of the loop, the noisy answer is generated by a DP
algorithm with privacy loss ϵi = jmϵ
u
i .
Case 3: Finally, when ωi = ⊥ (i.e., the query is declined),
the decision to decline depends on ϵui of all mechanism
applicable to the query (which is independent of the data)
rather than ϵi (which could depend on the data in the case of
ICQ-MPM). Therefore, Pr [Mi (D) = (ωi , ϵi )] = Pr [Mi (D ′) =
(ωi , ϵi )] for all D,D ′. The proof would fail if the decision to
deny a query depends on ϵi . □
7 QUERY BENCHMARK EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate APEx on real datasets using a set
of benchmark queries. We show:
• APEx is able to effectively translate queries associated
with accuracy bounds into differentially private mech-
anisms. These mechanisms accurately answer a wide
variety of interesting data exploration queries with mod-
erate to low privacy loss.
• The set of query benchmarks show that no single mech-
anism can dominate the rest and APEx picks the mecha-
nism with the least privacy loss for all the queries.
7.1 Setup
Datasets. Our experiments use two real world datasets. The
first data set Adult was extracted from 1994 US Census re-
lease [7]. This dataset includes 15 attributes (6 continuous
and 9 categorical), such as "capital gain", "country", and a
binary "label" indicating whether an individual earns more
than 5000 or not, for a total of 32, 561 individuals. The second
dataset, refereed as NYTaxi, includes 9, 710, 124 NYC’s yel-
low taxi trip records [1]. Each record consists of 17 attributes,
such as categorical attributes (e.g., "pick-up-location"), and
continuous attributes (e.g., "trip distance").
Query Benchmarks.We design 12meaningful exploration
queries on Adult and NYTaxi datasets, summarized in Ta-
ble 1. These 12 queries cover the three types of explo-
ration queries defined in Section 3.1, QW1-4, QI1-4, and
QT1-4 corresponds to WCQ, ICQ, and TCQ respectively.
Queries with number 1 and 2 are for Adult, and with num-
ber 3 and 4 are for NYTaxi. The predicate workload W
cover 1D histogram, 1D prefix, 2D histogram and count
over multiple dimensions. We set β = 0.0005 and vary
α ∈ {0.02, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32, 0.64}.
Metrics. For each query (q,α , β), APEx outputs (ϵ,ω) after
running a differentially private mechanism, where ϵ is the
actual privacy loss and ω is the noisy answer. The empirical
error of aWCQqW (D) is measured as ∥ω−qW (D)∥∞/|D |, the
scaled maximum error of the counts. The empirical errors of
ICQ qW ,>c (D) and TCQ qW ,k (D) are measured as ∥α ∥∞/|D |,
the scaled maximum distance of mislabeled predicates.
Implementation Details. APEx is implemented using
python-3.4, and is run on a machine with 64 cores and 256
GB memory. We run APEx with optimistic mode. For strat-
egy mechanism, we choose H2 strategy (a hierarchical set of
counts [26, 27, 31]) for all queries.
7.2 APEx End-to-End Study
We run APEx for the 12 queries shown in Table 1 with dif-
ferent accuracy requirements from 0.01|D | to 0.64|D | and
β = 0.0005. We show in Figure 2 that a line connects points
(α , ϵu ) where ϵu is the upper bound on the privacy loss for
the mechanism chosen by APEx for the given α . For all the
queries except QI2 and QI3, the mechanism chosen for each
α incurs an actual privacy cost at ϵ = ϵu and the only varia-
tion in the empirical error, so the corresponding (αˆ/|D |, ϵ)
of 10 runs is shown as boxplots. For QI2 and QI3, both the
empirical error and the actual privacy cost (αˆ/|D |, ϵ) vary
across runs and hence are plotted as points in Figure 2.
The empirical error α is always bounded by the theoretical
α for all the queries. The gap between the theoretical line and
the actual boxplots/points are: (1) the analysis of the error is
not tight due to the use of union bound; (2) for mechanism
with data dependent translation (QI2 and QI3), the actual
privacy cost is far from the upperbound ϵu resulting a left
shift of the points from the theoretical line. The privacy
cost for QW1 and QW2 for Adult dataset is in the range of
(10−4, 10−1) for all α values. This privacy cost is 2-3 orders
larger than the privacy cost for QW3 andQW4 on the NYTaxi
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Name D Query workloadW Query output
QW1 Adult "capital gain"∈ [0, 50), "capital gain"∈ [50, 100), ...,"capital gain"∈ [4950, 5000) bin counts
QW2 Adult "capital gain"∈ [0, 50), "capital gain"∈ [0, 100), ..., "capital gain"∈ [0, 5000) bin counts
QW3 NYTaxi "trip distance"∈ [0, 0.1), "capital gain"∈ [0, 50), ...,"capital gain"∈ [0, 50) bin counts
QW4 NYTaxi (0 ≤"total amount"< 1∧ "passenger"= 1),.., (9 ≤"total amount"< 10∧ "passenger"= 10) bin counts
QI1 Adult "capital gain"< 50, "capital gain"< 100,..., "capital gain"< 5000 bin ids having counts > 0.1|D |
QI2 Adult (0 ≤"capital gain"< 100, "sex"=’M’),...(4500 ≤"capital gain"< 5000, "sex"=’F’) bin ids having counts > 0.1|D |
QI3 NYTaxi "fare amount"∈ [0, 0, 1), "fare amount"∈ [0.1, 2),..., "fare amount"∈ [9.9, 10) bin ids having counts > 0.1|D |
QI4 NYTaxi "total amount"∈ [0, 0, 1), "total amount"∈ [0.1, 2),..., "total amount"∈ [9.9, 10) bin ids having counts > 0.1|D |
QT1 Adult "age"= 0,"age"= 1,...,"age"= 99 top 10 bins with highest counts
QT2 Adult 100 predicates on different attributes, e.g. "age"= 1, "workclass"="private",... top 10 bins with highest counts
QT3 NYTaxi ("PUID"=1 ∧"DOID"=1), ("PUID"=1 ∧ "DOID"=2),..,("PUID"=10 ∧ "DOID"=10) top 10 bins with highest counts
QT4 NYTaxi 100 predicates on different attributes, e.g. "pickup date"= 1, "passenger count"= 1,... top 10 bins with highest counts
Table 1: Query benchmarks includes 3 types of exploration queries on 2 datasets.
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Figure 2: Privacy cost and empirical accuracy using optimal mechanism chosen byAPEx (Optimistic Mode) on the
12 queries at default parameter setting with α ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32, 0.64}|D | and β = 5 × 10−4. On Adult
data, all queries can be answered with empirical error < 0.1 with privacy budget < 0.1; on NYTaxi data, all queries
can be answered with empirical error < 0.1 with privacy budget < 0.001. When accuracy requirement relaxes (i.e.,
α increases), the privacy cost decreaess and the empirical accuracy decreases for all queries.
dataset, because given the same ratio α/|D |, the queries on
NYTaxi has a larger α than Adult because of data size.
To further understand the relation between our accuracy
requirement with commonly used error metric, we use F1
score to measure the similarity between the correct answer
set and noisy answer set outputted from the mechanism.
Figure 3 presents the F1 score of two queries: QI4 of an ICQ,
and QT1 of a TCQ. In QT1, when α from 0.02|D | to 0.64|D |,
the median F1 score decreases from 0.9 to 0.15, which has a
steeper gradient than the changes in Figure 2 and a closer
trend with the theoretical α . In QI4, the F1 score is even more
consistent with α and the empirical error shown in Figure 2.
This shows that our (α , β) accuracy requirement is still a
good indicator in data exploration process.
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Mechanism Query-α
QW1-0.02|D| QW1-0.08|D| QW2-0.02|D| QW2-0.08|D| QW3-0.02|D| QW3-0.08|D| QW4-0.02|D| QW4-0.08|D|
WCQ-LM 0.01874 0.00469 1.87430 0.46858 0.00629 0.00157 0.00006 0.00002
WCQ-SM 0.09880 0.02383 0.10451 0.02251 0.00036 0.00008 0.00033 0.00009
QI1-0.02|D| QI1-0.08|D| QI2-0.02|D| QI2-0.08|D| QI3-0.02|D| QI3-0.08|D| QI4-0.02|D| QI4-0.08|D|
ICQ-LM 1.76786 0.44197 0.01768 0.00442 0.00006 0.000015 0.00593 0.00148
ICQ-SM 0.10271 0.02682 0.10506 0.02517 0.00033 0.00008 0.00034 0.00008
ICQ-MPM 0.63644 0.31822 0.00636 0.00371 0.00003 0.000014 0.00640 0.00178
QT1-0.02|D| QT1-0.08|D| QT2-0.02|D| QT2-0.08|D| QT3-0.02|D| QT3-0.08|D| QT4-0.02|D| QT4-0.08|D|
TCQ-LM 0.03536 0.00884 266.24590 66.56148 0.00012 0.00003 1.40857 0.35214
TCQ-LTM 0.35358 0.08840 0.35358 0.08840 0.00119 0.00030 0.00119 0.00030
Table 2: Privacy cost using all applicable mechanisms on the 12 queries (Table 1) at α = {0.02, 0.08}|D | and β =
5× 10−4. Median of 10 runs is reported for data-dependent mechanisms. It shows that (a) no single mechanism can
always win or lose, (b) privacy cost of different mechanisms answering the same query, and privacy cost of same
mechanism on different queries can be significantly different. Therefore, it is critical to use APEx for choosing
optimal mechanisms.
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Figure 3: Privacy cost and empirical accuracy ( F1
score) using optimal mechanism chosen by APEx (Op-
timistic Mode) on QI4 and QT1.
7.3 Optimal Mechanism Study
We run all the applicable mechanisms for the 12 queries from
Table 1 at α ∈ {0.02|D |, 0.08|D |} and show the median of the
actual privacy costs in Table 2. The privacy cost with the least
value is in bold for the given query and accuracy. Indeed,
APEx picks the mechanisms with these least privacy cost
for all the 12 queries. APEx can save more than 90% of the
privacy cost of the baseline translation (LM), such as QW2,
QW3, QT2,QT4, and all the ICQ. In particular, the baseline
mechanism LM is highly dependent on the sensitivity of
the query. For example, the workload in QW2 (a cumulative
histogram query) and QT2 (counts on many attributes) has
a high sensitivity, so the cost of WCQ-LM is 20 times larger
than WCQ-SM for QW2 at α = 0.08|D |, and the cost of
TCQ-LM is 760X more expensive than TCQ-LTM for QT2 at
α = 0.02|D, where WCQ-SM and TCQ-LTM are the optimal
mechanisms chosen by APEx for QW2 and QT2 respectively.
The optimal mechanism chosen byAPEx can change query
parameters: workload size L, k in TCQ, and threshold c in
ICQ. Figure 4 shows the effects of these parameters.
Vary Workload Size L. Figure 4a shows the privacy cost
of the baseline mechanism WCQ-LM and the special mech-
anism WCQ-SM when varying workload size using QW1
and QW2 templates. WCQ-LM is highly dependent on the
sensitivity of the query. Hence, the privacy cost of WCQ-LM
on QW1 changes very slowly with the workload size as the
sensitivity of the workload in QW1 is 1 while the privacy
cost on QW2 is linear to workload size L because the the
sensitivity of cumulative histogram is L. On the other hand,
WCQ-SM incurs similar privacy cost on QW1 and QW2,
since both queries share the same workload size and accu-
racy parameters. The privacy cost of WCQ-SM for QW1 and
QW2 are similar as they are using the same H2 strategy ma-
trix. Their difference in Table 2 is mainly due to different runs
of privacy cost estimation using MC simulation. However,
their accuracy can be different, as QW2 with a cumulative
histogram workload needs to add up logL number of noisy
counts from the strategy matrix for one of its largest count.
On the other hand, the histogram counts from QW1 requires
only one noisy count. Similar findings have been observed
on other query types and mechanisms; therefore, we omit to
show other plots here.
Vary top threshold k . Figure 4b shows the sensitivity of
privacy cost of TCQ-LM and TCQ-TM with respect to vary-
ing k , using QT3 and QT4 as examples. The privacy cost of
TCQ-LM is independent of k as shown in Figure 4b, but the
cost of TCQ-LTM increases linearly with k. The privacy cost
of TCQ-LTM for both QT3 and QT4 have the same privacy
cost, because its cost only depends on k and the accuracy
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Figure 4: Privacy cost with query specific parameters: (a) Increasing workload size causes faster privacy cost in-
crease fro WCQ-SM than WCQ-LM. (b) Increasing TCQ k leads to faster privacy cost increase for TCQ-TM than
TCQ-LM. (c) Varying ICQ threshold c affects privacy cost ICQ-MPM. The closer c relates to the true count, more
attempts is needed, hence more privacy cost.
parameters, but the privacy cost of LTM for QT3 and QT4
are very different because the HD QT4 has larger sensitivity.
Vary counting threshold c. Figure 4c shows the actual
privacy cost of mechanisms for QI2 with different thresholds.
All the mechanisms for ICQ except ICQ-MPM, have a fixed
privacy cost which is dependent of the data and the query
(including c). However, we observe an interesting trend for
the actual privacy cost used by ICQ-MPM as c increases.
The smallest privacy cost which takes place after c = 0.8 is
1/10 of the upper bound of ICQ-MPM. The privacy cost of
ICQ-MPM depends on the number of poking times before
returning a output, which is related to the distance between
the threshold and the true counts associated to the predicates.
If the predicates are far from the threshold, the fewer number
of poking is required and hence a smaller privacy budget is
spent. On the other hand, if the true count is very close to
the threshold, then it requires a small noise and hence all the
budget to decide the label of this predicate with confidence.
When c = 0.01|D |, 98% predicates are within the range [c −
α , c + α], and hence to confidently decide the label for all
these predicates require more poking and hence a larger
privacy cost. Consider the many predicates having counts
close to 0.01|D |, the cost of ICQ-MPM is high. As c increases
to 0.10|D |, all predicates have sufficient different counts as c ,
then 1 or 2 times of poking are sufficient. When c continue
increases to 0.32|D |, there is a single predicate that with true
count (which is 0.3117|D |) closer to c , it again requires more
pokings to make a confident decision. A similar behavior is
seen when c is around 0.6050|D |.
Moreover, in the bad cases where c is close to true counts,
the actual privacy cost of ICQ-MPMmight bemore expensive
than the baseline ICQ-LM. For example, when c = 0.01|D |,
ICQ-LM is better. This is a case whereAPEx under optimistic
mode fails to choose ICQ-LM as the optimal mechanism.
In summary, we see that the optimal mechanism with
the least privacy cost changes among queries and even the
same query with different parameters. This shows there is a
great need for systems like APEx to provide translation and
identify optimal mechanisms.
8 CASE STUDY
In this section, we design an application benchmark based
on entity resolution to show that (1) we can express real
data exploration workflow using our exploration language;
(2) APEx allows entity resolution workflow to be conducted
with high accuracy and strong privacy guarantee, (3) APEx
allows trade-off between privacy and final task quality for a
given exploration task.
8.1 Case Study Setting
Entity Resolution (ER) is an application of identifying table
records that refer to the same real-world object. In this case,
we use the citations [6] dataset to perform exploration
tasks. Each row in the table is a pair of citation records, with a
binary label indicatingwhether they are duplicates or not. All
the citation records share the same schema, which consists of
3 text attributes of title, authors and venue, and one integer
attribute of publication year. A training set D of size 4000 is
sampled from citations such that every record appears at
most once. Two exploration tasks for entity resolution on D
are considered: blocking and matching. These two tasks are
achieved by learning a boolean formula P (e.g. in DNF) over
similarity predicates. We express a similarity predicate p as a
tuple (A, t , sim,θ ) ∈ attr (R) × T × S × Θ, where A ∈ attr (R)
is an attribute in the schema t ∈ T is a transformation of
the attribute value, and sim ∈ S is a similarity function that
usually takes a real value often restricted to [0, 1], and θ ∈ Θ
is a threshold. Given a pair of records (r1, r2), a similarity
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predicate p returns either ‘True’ or ‘False’ with semantics:
p(r1, r2) ≡ (sim(t(r1.A), t(r2.A)) > θ ).
In this case study, the exploration task for blocking is to
find a boolean formula Pb that identifies a small set of can-
didate matching pairs that cover most of the true matches,
known as high recall, with a small blocking cost (a small
fraction of pairs in the data that return true for Pb ). The
exploration task for matching is to identify a boolean for-
mula Pm that identifies matching records that achieves high
recall and precision on Dt . Precision measures whether Pm
classifies true non-matches as matches, and recall measures
the fraction of true matches that are captured by Pm . The
quality of this task is measured by F Pm1 , the harmonic mean
of precision and recall.
Using exploration queries supported by APEx, we can ex-
press two exploration strategies for each task: BS1 (MS1)
using WCQ only to complete blocking (matching) task, and
BS2 (MS2) using ICQ/TCQ to conduct the blocking (match-
ing) task. Each strategy generates a sequence of exploration
queries which interact with APEx and constructs a boolean
formula for the corresponding task. For each strategy, we
randomly sample a concrete cleaner from our cleaner model
and report mean and quartiles of its cleaning quality over 100
runs. Both the cleaner model and the exploration strategies
are detailed by Figure 8 and Figure 9 in Appendix C.
8.2 End-to-End Task Evaluation
We report the end-to-end performance of APEx on the four
exploration strategies.
Vary Privacy Constraint. Given an exploration strategy
from BS1, BS2, MS1, MS2 on training data D, a sequence of
queries is generated based on its interaction with APEx until
the privacy loss exceeds the privacy constraint B specified
by the data owner. The accuracy requirement for this set of
experiments is fixed to be α = 0.008|Dt |, β = 0.0005. The
privacy constraint varies from 0.1 to 2. Each exploration
strategy is repeated 100 times under a given privacy con-
straint and we report the output quality of these 100 runs at
different privacy constraint.
Figure 5 shows the exploration quality (recall for blocking
task and F1 for matching task) of 100 runs of each exploration
strategy at B = {0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}. We observe that the
expected task quality (median and variance) improves as the
budget constraint increases and gets stable after, for example
reaching B ≥ 1 for MS1. Since we fixed α , the privacy loss
for each exploration query is also fixed. Thus, B directly con-
trols the number of queriesAPEx answers before halting. For
small B < 0.2, only a few queries are answered and the clean-
ing quality is close to random guessing. As B increases, more
queries can be learned about the dataset. After B reaches a
certain value around 1.0, APEx can answer sufficient num-
ber of queries; therefore obtaining high accuracy. For MS2,
when it reaches good F1 score at B = 1, more noisy answers
can mislead the MS2 strategy to add more predicates to the
blocking conjunction function, and decrease the quality.
The privacy cost used by each ICQ and TCQ is generally
less than what has spent on the corresponding WCQ, as less
information is shown to the data analyst. Given the same
privacy budget, e.g. when B = 0.5, more queries can be
answered in BS2 than BS1, results in a 25% better recall. We
observe the same trend in MS1 and MS2. This shows that
it is important for APEx to support translation for different
types of queries for better end-to-end accuracy.
Vary Accuracy Requirement. This section shows the task
quality of each exploration strategy at different accuracy
requirements under a fixed privacy constraint B = 1.0. For
each α ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08, 0.16, 0.32, 0.64}|D |, the ex-
ploration strategy interacts with APEx until the privacy loss
exceeds B = 1.0. Each exploration is repeated 100 times and
we report the quality of the constructed boolean formula of
these 100 runs. As shown in Figure 6 the quality of the four
exploration strategies all improves first as accuracy require-
ment relaxes and then degrades again under B = 1.0. This
is because when there is a privacy constraint, APEx only al-
lows a limited number of queries to be answered. Given this
fixed privacy budget B = 1 and a fixed accuracy requirement
α , the number of queries can be answered is bounded and
related to α . When α first increases from 0.01|D | to 0.08|D |,
more queries can be answered and give more information on
which predicates to choose. However, as α keeps growing,
the answers get noisier and misleading, resulting in the drop
in quality, even though more questions can be answered.
Vary Data Size.We also experimented the same strategies
with a different data size |D | = 1000, using blocking strate-
gies as examples to study the effects of data size, as shown in
Figure 7. Comparing to Figure 5 where α is fixed at 0.08|D |,
the privacy cost to achieve optimal recall is larger when |D |
is smaller. BS1 and BS2 can achieve very good recall when
|D | = 4000 given a privacy budget B = 1, but they require at
leastB = 1.5 to reach similar qualitywhen |D | = 1000. On the
other hand, comparing to Figure 6 where the privacy budget
is fixed B = 1, the optimal α for smaller |D | is very close. BS1
and BS2 reach the highest recall at aboutα = 0.16·1000 = 160
which is close to the optimal α = 0.8 · 4000 = 320 when
|D | = 4000. This observation suggests an interesting direc-
tion for future work: choosing the optimal α for different
queries in an exploration process.
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Figure 5: Performance of APEx for blocking (BS1, BS2) and matching (MS1, MS2) tasks with increasing privacy
budget B at fixed α = 0.08|D |: the expected task quality improves with smaller variance as the budget constraint
increases and gets stable. Fixing α fixes privacy cost per operation. Thus increasing B increases the number of
queries answered.
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Figure 6: Performance of APEx for blocking (BS1, BS2) and matching (MS1, MS2) at fixed privacy budget B = 1
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Figure 7: Performance of APEx for blocking (BS1, BS2) tasks at |D | = 1000. Compared with Figure 5 where α =
0.08|D |, the privacy budget that needs to achieve good recall increases when data size is smaller. Compared with
Figure 6 where B = 1, the optimal α actually increases.
9 CONCLUSIONS
We proposedAPEx, a framework that allows data analysts to
interact with sensitive data while ensuring that their inter-
actions satisfy differential privacy. Using experiments with
query benchmarks and entity resolution application, we es-
tablished that APEx allows high exploration quality with a
reasonable privacy loss.
APEx opens many interesting future research directions.
First, more functionalities can be added toAPEx: (a) a recom-
mender which predicts the subsequent interesting queries
and advises the privacy cost of these queries to the analyst;
(b) an inferencer which uses historical answers to reduce
the privacy cost of a new incoming query; and (c) a sampler
which incorporate approximate query processing to have
3-way trade-off between efficiency, accuracy, and privacy.
More translation algorithms from accuracy to privacy, espe-
cially for data-dependentmechanisms and non-linear queries
can be implemented in APEx to further save privacy budget
throughout the exploration.We show the exploration queries
inAPEx to support entity resolution tasks. These exploration
queries can be extended to support other exploration tasks,
e.g., schema matching, feature engineering, tuning machine
learning workloads. This would also require extending our
system to handle relations with multiple tables, constraints
like functional dependencies, etc. APEx turns the differen-
tially private algorithm design problem on its head – it mini-
mizes privacy loss given an accuracy constraint. This new
formulation has applications on sensitive data exploration
and can trigger an entirely new line of research.
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A THEOREMS AND PROOFS
A.1 Laplace Mechanism (Theorem 5.2)
Privacy Proof for WCQ
Proof: For any pair of neighbouring databasesD andD ′ such
that |D\D ′ ∪ D ′\D | = 1, given a WCQ query qW , LM adds
noise drawn from Lap(b) to query cϕi , where b = ∥W∥1/ϵ .
Consider a column vector of counts y = [y1, · · · ,yL],
Pr[qW(D) + Lap(bW)L = y]
Pr[qW(D ′) + Lap(bW)L = y]
=
∏L
1 Pr[cϕi (D) + ηi = yi ]∏L
1 Pr[cϕi (D ′) + ηi = yi ]
=
L∏
1
exp(−ϵ |yi−cϕi (D) |∥W∥1 )
exp(−ϵ |yi−cϕi (D′) |∥W∥1 )
= exp( ϵ∥W∥1
L∑
1
(|yi − cϕi (D ′)| − |yi − cϕi (D)|))
≤ exp( ϵ∥W∥1
L∑
1
(|cϕi (D) − cϕi (D ′)|)) = exp(ϵ)
Therefore, it satisfies ϵ = ∥W∥1/b-differential privacy. □
Privacy Proof for ICQ and TCQ
Proof: For ICQ (and TCQ, respectively), Line 8 (Line 10)
post-processes the noisy answers only without accessing
the true data. By the post-processing property of differential
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privacy (Theorem B.2), Laplace mechanism for ICQ (TCQ)
satisfies ϵ = ∥W∥1/b-differential privacy. □
Accuracy Proof for WCQ
Proof: Give a WCQ qW , for any D ∈ D, setting b ≤
α
ln(1/(1−(1−β )1/L )) bounds the failing probability, i.e.,
Pr[∥LM(W, x) − qW (D)∥∞ ≥ α]
= 1 −
∏
i ∈[1,L]
(1 − Pr[|ηi | > α]) = 1 − (1 − e−α/b )L ≤ β □
Accuracy Proof for ICQ
Proof: Given ICQ qW ,>c , for any D ∈ D, setting b ≤
α
ln(1/(1−(1−β )1/L ))−ln 2 bounds the failure probability, i.e.,
Pr[|{ϕ ∈ M(D) | cϕ (D) < c − α }| > 0]
= 1 −
∏
ϕ∈W :cϕ (D)−c+α<0
(1 − Pr[cϕ (D) − c + η > 0])
≤ 1 −
∏
ϕ∈W :cϕ (D)−c+α<0
(1 − Pr[η > α])
≤ 1 − (1 − e−α/b/2)L < β
The proof for the other condition is analogous. □
Accuracy Proof for TCQ
Proof: Given a TCQ qW ,k , for any D ∈ D, W.L.O.G. let
cϕ1 (D) ≥ · · · ≥ cϕk (D) · · · ≥ cL(D) and the noise added
to these counts be η1, . . . ,ηL respectively. Let ck = cϕk (D)
the kth largest counting value. Setting noise parameter b ≤
α
2 ln(L/(2β )) bounds the failing probability, i.e.,
Pr[|{ϕ ∈ M(D) | cϕ (D) < ck − α }| > 0]
≤ 1 − Pr[( max
i>k,cϕi (D)<ck−α
ηi <
α
2 ) ∧ (mini≤k ηi > −
α
2 )]
= Pr[( max
i>k,cϕi (D)<ck−α
ηi ≥ α2 ) ∨ (mini≤k ηi ≥ −
α
2 )]
≤ (L − k)e−α/(2b)/2 + ke−α/(2b)/2 = Leα/(2b)/2 ≤ β (7)
The proof for Pr[|{ϕ ∈ (Φ−M(D)) | cϕ (D) > ck+α }| > 0] ≤ β
is analogous. □
A.2 Strategy-based Mechanism for WCQ
Theorem A.1. Given a WCQ qW : D → RL , for a table
D ∈ D, let (W, x) = T(W ,D). Let A be a strategy used in
Algorithm 3 to answer qW . When ϵ ≥ ∥A∥1 ∥WA
+ ∥F
α
√
β/2
, A-strategy
mechanism achieves (α , β)-WCQ accuracy.
Proof. The noise vector added to the final query answer
of qW (·) using A-strategy mechanism is ηˆ = [ηˆ1, . . . , ηˆL] =
(WA+)η. Each noise variable ηˆi has a mean of 0, and a vari-
ance of σ 2i = ci · (2b2), where ci =
∑l
j=1(WA+)[i, j]2, and
hence Pr[|ηˆi | ≥ α] ≤ 2cib
2
A
α 2 by Chebyshev’s inequality. By
union bound, the failing probability is bounded by
Pr[∥LM(W, x) − qW (D)∥∞ ≥ α]
= Pr[∪i ∈[1,L] |ηi | ≥ α] ≤
∑
i ∈[1,L]
2cib2
α2
≤ β
It requires b ≤ α
√
β/2
∥WA+ ∥F , hence ϵ ≥ ∥A∥1/b ≥
∥A∥1 ∥WA+ ∥F
α
√
β/2
.
□
Proof for Theorem 5.3
Proof. Given an ϵ , the simulation in the function
estimateFailingRateMC() ensures that with high probabil-
ity 1−p, the true failing probability βt to bound ∥(WA+)η∥∞
by α lies within βe ± δβ . The failing probability to bound
βt < βe + δβ is p/2. By union bound, ϵ ensures (α , β ′)-WCQ
accuracy, where β ′ < β+δβ+p/2. If (β+δβ)(1−p/2)+p/2 <
β + δβ + p/2 < β , then this ϵ ensures (α , β)-WCQ accuracy.
Beside this estimation, in the binary search of translate(),
we stop when ϵmin and ϵmax are sufficiently close. Hence, the
privacy cost returned by translate() is an approximated
minimal privacy cost required for (α , β)-WCQ accuracy. □
A.3 Multi-Poking Mechanism for ICQ
Wewould like to show Theorem 5.5 that given a queryqW ,>c ,
multi-poking mechanism (Algorithm 4), achieves (α , β)-
ICQ accuracy by executing function run(qW ,>c ,α , β ,D),
with differential privacy cost of ϵ returned by function
translate(qW ,>c ,α , β).
Proof. For each ϕ ∈W , (i) when qϕ (D) < c − α ,
Pr[ϕ ∈ MPMα,βqϕ, >c (D) | cϕ (D) < c − α]
=
m−1∑
i=0
Pr[cϕ (D) − c + η − αi + α > 0 | cϕ (D) − c + α < 0]
<
m−1∑
i=0
Pr[ηi > αi ] =
m−1∑
i=0
e−αiϵi /∥W∥1/2 =m · β/(mL) = β/L
and (ii) when qϕ (D) < c + α ,
Pr[ϕ < MPMα,βϕ,>c (D) | cϕ (D) > c + α]
=
m−1∑
i=0
Pr[cϕ (D) − c + η + αi − α < 0 | cϕ (D) − c − α > 0]
<
m−1∑
i=0
Pr[ηi < −αi ] =
m−1∑
i=0
e−αiϵi /∥W∥1/2 =m · β/(mL) = β/L
As |W | = L, the failing probability is bounded by β .
The RelaxPrivacy Algorithm [22] correlates the new
noise ηi+1 with noise ηi from the previous iteration In this
way, the composition of the first i+1 iterations is ϵi+1, and the
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noise added in the i+1th iteration is equivalent to a noise gen-
erated with Laplace distribution with privacy budget ϵi+1 and
the first i iterations also satisfy ϵi -DP for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1
(Theorem 9 for single-dimension and Theorem 10 for high-
dimension [22]). □
A.4 Laplace Top-k Mechanism for TCQ
We would like show the privacy and tolerance requirement
of Laplace Top-k Mechanism stated in Theorem 5.6. The
proof for accuracy is similar to the accuracy proof of Laplace
mechanism for TCQ (Appendix A.1). Then we show that
Algorithm 5 achieves minimal ϵ-differential privacy cost,
where ϵ = k/b = 2k ln(L/(2β ))α .
Proof. Fix D = D ′ ∪ {t}. Let (x1, . . . ,xL), respectively
(x ′1, . . . ,x ′L), denote the vector of answers to the set of lin-
ear counting queries qϕ1 , . . . ,qϕL when the table is D, re-
spectively D ′. Two properties are used: (1) Monotonicity of
Counts: for all j ∈ [L], x j ≥ x ′j ; and (2) Lipschitz Property:
for all j ∈ [L], 1 + x ′j ≥ x j .
Fix any k different values (i1, . . . , ik ) from [L], and fix
noises (ηik+1 , . . . ,ηiL ) drawn from Lap(k/ϵ)L−k used for the
remaining linear counting queries. Given these fixed noises,
for l ∈ {i1, . . . , ik }, we define
η∗l = minη : (xl + η > ( maxj ∈ik+1, ...,iL x j + ηj )) (8)
For each l ∈ {i1, . . . , ik }, we have
x ′l + (1 + η∗l ) = (1 + x ′l ) + η∗l ≥ xl + η∗l
> max
j ∈ik+1, ...,iL
x j + ηj ≥ max
j ∈ik+1, ...,iL
x ′j + ηj
Hence, if ηl ≥ r ∗l + 1 for all l ∈ {i1, . . . , ik }, then (i1, . . . , ik )
will be the output when the table is D ′ and the noise vector
is (ηi1 , . . . ,ηik , . . . ,ηL). The probabilities below are over the
choices of (ηi1 , . . . ,ηik ) ∼ Lap(k/ϵ)k .
Pr[(i1, . . . , ik ) | D ′,ηii+1 , . . . ,ηiL ]
≥
∏
l ∈{i1, ...,ik }
Pr[ηl ≥ 1 + η∗l ] ≥
∏
l ∈{i1, ...,ik }
e−k/ϵ Pr[ηl ≥ η∗l ]
≥ e−ϵ Pr[(i1, . . . , ik ) | D,ηii+1 , . . . ,ηiL ] (9)
Proof of the other direction follows analogously.
Therefore, ϵ-differential privacy is guaranteed. □
B COMPOSITION THEOREMS
The sequential composition theorem helps assess the privacy
loss of multiple differentialy private mechanisms.
Theorem B.1 (Seqential Composition [10]). LetM1(·)
andM2(·, ·) be algorithms with independent sources of random-
ness that ensure ϵ1- and ϵ2-differential privacy respectively. An
algorithm that outputs bothM1(D) = O1 andM2(O1,D) = O2
ensures (ϵ1 + ϵ2)-differential privacy.
Another important property of differential privacy is that
postprocessing the outputs does not degrade privacy.
Theorem B.2 (Post-Processing [10]). Let M1(·) be an
algorithm that satisfies ϵ-differential privacy. If applying an
algorithmM2 the output ofM1(·), then the overall mechanism
M2 ◦M1(·) also satisfies ϵ-differential privacy.
All steps in the post-processing algorithm do not access
the raw data, so they do not affect the privacy analysis. Hence,
any smart choices made by the data analyst after receiving
the noisy answers from the privacy engine are considered as
post-processing steps and do not affect the privacy analysis.
C CLEANER MODEL
The cleaning engineer typically narrows down the choices
through a sequence of actions, consisting of issuing queries
and making choices based on the answer of issued query. We
use a strategy to denote a class of actions that use the same
set of queries but make different choices. Figure 8 shows
the strategies for the blocking task. These two strategies
are different as they use different query types, though they
share the same criteria of decision choices. In particular, the
queries q1,q5 in the strategy shown in Figure 8a are WCQ,
while the queries q1′,q5′ in Figure 8b are TCQ and ICQ
respectively. This case exemplifies how a cleaning engineer
constructs a single path (disjunction) of predicates to form
a blocking function, though a real function can be more
complex [11]. Similarly, Figure 9 illustrates two matching
strategies using WCQ (Figure 9a) and ICQ/TCQ (Figure 9b),
respectively, where the matching function is formed as a
conjunction of predicates.
The cleaner model encodes the space of all the parameters
involved in the cleaner’s decisions c1-c6. Table 3 summarizes
the space of all the parameters for c1-c6 in blocking strategy
1. From c1 to c4, the program chooses (1) a subset of
attributes x1 of size ranging from 2 up to the total number
of attributes |attr (R)|, (2) a subset of transformations
x2 from T = {2дrams, 3дrams, SpaceTokenization},
(3) a subset of similarity functions x3 from S =
{Edit , SmithWater , Jaro,Cosine, Jaccard,Overlap,Di f f },
and (4) x6 thresholds from the range of [x4,x5], where
x4 ∈ (0, 0.5), x5 ∈ (0.5, 1), and x6 ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The cross
product of these choices forms a set of predicates P , and c5a
picks an ordering x7, one of the permutation of P . In c5b, the
model sets the criterion for pruning or keeping a predicate p
from the top list of P . In particular, the model sets x8 and x9
as the minimum fraction of the remaining matches caught
and the maximum fraction of the remaining non-matches
caught by p ∨ O respectively, where x8 ∈ [0.2, 0.5] and
x9 ∈ [0.1, 0.2]. These values are reset as x8 = x8/x10 and
x9 = x9x10 where x10 ∈ {2, 3} if all predicates have been
checked but O = ∅. In c6, the model considers three
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(q1, 𝛼): What is the number of Null values for all attributes?
For each (𝐴, 𝐴′):  BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {𝐴 IS NULL OR 𝐴 ′ IS NULL } 
c1: Cleaner chooses 2 attributes with least Nulls: 𝐴𝑖 ∈ {𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒, 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠}, 
initializes disjunction of predicates 𝑂 = ∅
q2: Show transformations for ‘title’
c2: Cleaner chooses a subset of transformations: t∈ {2grams, SpaceTokenization}
q3: Show similarity functions for ‘2grams(title)’ 
c3: Cleaner chooses a subset of similarity functions: sim ∈ {Jaccard, Cosine}
q4: Show the range of similarity thresholds for ‘cosine(2grams(title))’
c4: Cleaner chooses 𝜃 ∈ [0.5, 1]
(q5a, 𝛼): What is the fraction of the remaining matches caught by p?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {¬𝑂 AND p AND label=‘MATCH’}
(q5b, 𝛼): What is the fraction of the remaining non-matches caught by p?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {¬𝑂 AND p AND label=‘NON-MATCH’}
A set of candidate predicates 𝑃 = { p: sim t Ai) , t(Ai
′ > 𝜃}
c5a: Cleaner forms WCQ queries using predicates p by descending 𝜃
c5b: Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: 
if it catches >50% of remain_matches and  <10% of remain_non-matches.
c6: Cleaner chooses to update 𝑂 = 𝑂 ∨ 𝑝,
updates remain_matches (remain_non_matches) with answer to q5a (q5b)
…
(q1’, 𝛼): What are the top-2 attributes with least Nulls?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W={𝐴𝑖 IS NULL OR 𝐴𝑖
′ IS NULL }
ORDER BY COUNT(*) LIMIT 2  
(q5a’, 𝛼): Is the fraction of the remaining matches caught by p > 50%? 
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {¬𝑂 AND p AND label=‘MATCH’}
HAVING COUNT(*) > 0.5 × remain_matches
(q5b’, 𝛼): Is the fraction of the remaining non-matches caught by p < 10%?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {¬𝑂 AND p AND label=‘NON-MATCH’}
HAVING COUNT(*) > 0.9 × remain_non_matches
A set of candidate predicates 𝑃 = { p: sim t Ai) , t(Ai
′ > 𝜃}
c5a: Cleaner forms an ICQ query of predicates p in descending 𝜃
c5b: Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: 
if it catches >50% of remain_matches and  <10% of remain_non_matches.
c6: Cleaner chooses to update 𝑂 = 𝑂 ∨ 𝑝, 
updates remain_matches (remain_non_matches) with answer to q5a’ (q5b’) 
(a) Strategy instance 1 for blocking
(q1, 𝛼): What is the number of Null values for all attributes?
For each (𝐴, 𝐴′):  BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {𝐴 IS NULL OR 𝐴 ′ IS NULL } 
c1: Cleaner chooses 2 attributes with least Nulls: 𝐴𝑖 ∈ {𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒, 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑠}, 
initializes disjunction of predicates 𝑂 = ∅
q2: Show transformations for ‘title’
c2: Cleaner chooses a subset of transformations: t∈ {2grams, SpaceTokenization}
q3: Show similarity functions for ‘2grams(title)’ 
c3: Cleaner chooses a subset of similarity functions: sim ∈ {Jaccard, Cosine}
q4: Show the range of similarity thresholds for ‘cosine(2grams(title))’
c4: Cleaner chooses 𝜃 ∈ [0.5, 1]
(q5a, 𝛼): What is the fraction of the remaining matches caught by p?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {¬𝑂 AND p AND label=‘MATCH’}
(q5b, 𝛼): What is the fraction of the remaining non-matches caught by p?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {¬𝑂 AND p AND label=‘NON-MATCH’}
A set of candidate predicates 𝑃 = { p: sim t Ai) , t(Ai
′ > 𝜃}
c5a: Cleaner forms WCQ queries using predicates p by descending 𝜃
c5b: Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: 
if it catches >50% of remain_matches and  <10% of remain_non-matches.
c6: Cleaner chooses to update 𝑂 = 𝑂 ∨ 𝑝,
updates remain_matches (remain_non_matches) with answer to q5a (q5b)
…
(q1’, 𝛼): What are the top-2 attributes with least Nulls?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W={𝐴𝑖 IS NULL OR 𝐴𝑖
′ IS NULL }
ORDER BY COUNT(*) LIMIT 2  
(q5a’, 𝛼): Is the fraction of the remaining matches caught by p > 50%? 
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {¬𝑂 AND p AND label=‘MATCH’}
HAVING COUNT(*) > 0.5 × remain_matches
(q5b’, 𝛼): Is the fraction of the remaining non-matches caught by p < 10%?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {¬𝑂 AND p AND label=‘NON-MATCH’}
HAVING COUNT(*) > 0.9 × remain_non_matches
A set of candidate predicates 𝑃 = { p: sim t Ai) , t(Ai
′ > 𝜃}
c5a: Cleaner forms an ICQ query of predicates p in descending 𝜃
c5b: Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: 
if it catches >50% of remain_matches and  <10% of remain_non_matches.
c6: Cleaner chooses to update 𝑂 = 𝑂 ∨ 𝑝, 
updates remain_matches (remain_non_matches) with answer to q5a’ (q5b’) 
(b) Strategy instance 2 for blocking
Figure 8: Two strategies for blocking
possible styles of cleaners on trusting the noisy answers:
neutral style corresponds to trust the noisy answers; for
optimistic (pessimistic) style, the cleaner trusts the values
by adding (subtracting) α/5 to (from) the noisy answers. If
the criterion is met and the blocking cost over Dt is less
than a fixed cutoff threshold (e.g., a hardware constraint, we
set 550 for citations dataset). An instance of all variables
C = (x1, . . . ,x11) in Table 3 forms a concrete cleaner. The
model for other strategies is similarly constructed.
D RELATEDWORK
DP in practice. Differential privacy [9] has emerged as
a popular standard in real-world analysis products [12–
14, 17, 25, 30]. There are well known techniques for special
tasks such as answering linear counting queries[16, 27, 31],
(q1, 𝛼): What is the number of Null values for all attributes? 
For each (𝐴, 𝐴′):  BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {𝐴 IS NULL OR 𝐴 ′ IS NULL } 
(q5a, 𝛼): What is the fraction of the captured matches pruned by p?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W={𝑂 AND p AND label=‘MATCH’}
(q5b, 𝛼): What is the fraction of the remaining non-matches pruned by p? 
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W={𝑂 AND p AND label=‘NON-MATCH’}
A set of candidate predicates 𝑃 = { p: sim t Ai) , t(Ai
′ > 𝜃}
c5a: Cleaner forms a WCQ query of predicates p in descending 𝜃
c5b: Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: 
if it prunes <1% of captured_matches and  >50% of captured_non_matches.
c6: Cleaner chooses to update 𝑂 = 𝑂 ∧ 𝑝,
updates captured_matches (captured_non_matches) with answer to q5a (q5b)
…
(q5a’, 𝛼): Is the fraction of the remaining matches pruned by p > 1%? 
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {𝑂 AND p AND label=‘MATCH’}
HAVING COUNT(*) > 0.01 × captured_matches
(q5b’, 𝛼): Is the fraction of the remaining non-matches pruned by p < 50%? 
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {𝑂 AND p AND label=‘NON-MATCH’}
HAVING COUNT(*) > 0.5 × captured_non_matches
A set of candidate predicates 𝑃 = { p: sim t Ai) , t(Ai
′ > 𝜃}
c5a: Cleaner forms an ICQ query of predicates p in descending 𝜃
c5b: Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: 
if it prunes <1% of captured_matches and  >50% of captured_non_matches.
…
(q1’, 𝛼): What are the top-2 attributes with least Nulls?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W={𝐴𝑖 IS NULL OR 𝐴𝑖
′ IS NULL }
ORDER BY COUNT(*) LIMIT 2  
c6: Cleaner chooses to update 𝑂 = 𝑂 ∧ 𝑝,
updates captured_matches (captured_non_matches) with answer to q5a’ (q5b’)(a) Strategy instance 1 for matching (MS1)
(q1, 𝛼): What is the number of Null values for all attri utes? 
For each (𝐴, 𝐴′):  BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {𝐴 IS NULL OR 𝐴 ′ IS NULL } 
(q5a, 𝛼): What is the fraction of the captured matches pruned by p?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W={𝑂 AND p AND label=‘MATCH’}
(q5b, 𝛼): What is the fraction of the remaining non-matches pruned by p? 
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W={𝑂 AND p AND label=‘NON-MATCH’}
A set of candidate predicates 𝑃 = { p: sim t Ai) , t(Ai
′ > 𝜃}
c5a: Cleaner forms a WCQ query of predicates p in descending 𝜃
c5b: Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: 
if it prunes <1% of captured_matches and  >50% of captured_non_matches.
c6: Cleaner chooses to update 𝑂 = 𝑂 ∧ 𝑝,
upd tes captur d_matches (captured_non_matches) with answer to q5a (q5b)
…
(q5a’, 𝛼): Is the fraction of the remaini g atches pruned by p > 1%? 
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {𝑂 AND p AND label=‘MATCH’}
HAVING COUNT(*) > 0.01 × captured_matches
(q5b’, 𝛼): Is the fraction of the remaining non-matches pruned by p < 50%? 
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W = {𝑂 AND p AND label=‘NON-MATCH’}
HAVING COUNT(*) > 0.5 × captured_non_matches
A set of candidate predicates 𝑃 = { p: sim t Ai) , t(Ai
′ > 𝜃}
c5a: Cleaner forms an ICQ query of predicates p in descending 𝜃
c5b: Cleaner chooses a criterion for predicate p: 
if it prunes <1% of captured_matches and  >50% of captured_non_matches.
…
(q1’, 𝛼): What are the top-2 attributes with least Nulls?
BIN D ON COUNT(*) WHERE W={𝐴𝑖 IS NULL OR 𝐴𝑖
′ IS NULL }
ORDER BY COUNT(*) LIMIT 2  
c6: Cleaner chooses to update 𝑂 = 𝑂 ∧ 𝑝,
updates captured_matches (captured_non_matches) with answer to q5a’ (q5b’)
(b) Strategy instance 2 for matching (MS2)
Figure 9: Two strategies for matching
top-k queries [24] and frequent itemset mining [28, 36]. How-
ever, all the proposed work focuses on a particular type of
query and there is no clear winner between these proposed
algorithms for a given query.APEx considers the key state-of-
the-art differentially private algorithms [8, 25, 27] and makes
decision on the algorithms on behalf of the data analyst.
General purpose frameworks like PINQ [32], wPINQ [33]
and ϵktelo [37] allow users to write programs in higher level
languages for various tasks. These systems automatically
prove that every program written in this framework ensures
differential privacy. FLEX [18] allows users to answer a SQL
query under a specified privacy budget. Unlike all these sys-
tems, APEx is the first that allows analysts ask a sequence
of queries in high level language and specify only an accu-
racy bound, rather than a privacy level. APEx automatically
computes the privacy level to match the accuracy level.
Accuracy constraints in DP. Our problem is similar in
spirit to Ligett et al. [29], which also considers analysts who
specify accuracy constraints. Rather than concentrating on
19
Table 3: A Cleaner Model for Blocking Strategy 1
A cleaner model C = {x1, . . . ,x11} for c1-c6 in Figure 8a
c1 Choose x1, an ordered subset of attributes with least
Nulls, where x1 ∈ {2, 3, |attr (R)|}
c2 Choose x2, an ordered subset of transformations
from T, where |x2 | ∈ {1, 2, 3}
c3 Choose x3, an ordered subset of similarity functions
from S, where |x3 | ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
c4 Choose a lower bounds x4 and a upper bound x5 of
threshold range, where x5 ∈ (0.5, 1), x4 ∈ (0, 0.5),
and evenly choose x6 thresholds in order of either
ASC or DSC, and x6 ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
c5a Predicate p is sequentially selected based the order
of x7 ∈ Permute(x1 × x2 × x3 × x6)
c5b Chooses a criterion for predicate p: if it catches < x8
fraction of the remaining matches and > x9 fraction
of remaining non-matches, where x8 ∈ [0.2, 0.5]
and x9 ∈ [0.1, 0.2]. Reset x8 = x8/x10 and x9 = x10x9,
x10 ∈ {2, 3} if all queries have been asked butO = ∅.
c6 Choose method x11 ∈ {neutral, optimistic,
pessimistic} to take tolerance into account. If con-
ditions are met, and the blocking cost is less than
cutoff threshold, add p to the output O and remove
it from P .
private machine learning theoretically, our focus is to explore
private data with accuracy guarantees. The main technical
differences are highlighted below.
First, the end-to-end problems in APEx and the approach
in Ligett et al. [29] are different. APEx aims to translate a
given query with accuracy bound, (q,α , β), to a differentially
private mechanism that achieves this accuracy bound with
the minimal privacy cost, (M, ϵ). On the other hand, Ligett et
al. [29] takes as input a given mechanism with accuracy bound
and a set of privacy budgets, (M,α , β , {ϵ1 < ϵ2 < · · · < ϵT }),
and outputs the minimal privacy cost (epsilon) for M to
achieve the accuracy bound. Unlike Ligett et al., APEx does
not need to take a set of privacy budgets as an input. For the
exploration queries in APEx, there are more than just one
differentially private mechanisms for each query type, and
none of these mechanisms dominate the others. Thus, in this
sense, the problem solved by APEx is more general than the
one solved by Ligett et al.
The second key difference between the approaches is the
following. APEx currently only supports mechanisms for
which the relationship between the accuracy bound and
the privacy loss epsilon can be established analytically. On
the other hand, Ligett et al. can handle arbitrarily complex
mechanisms, and use empirical error of the mechanisms to
pick the epsilon. In this way, the solution proposed by Ligett
et al. applies a larger class of mechanisms. Nevertheless,
for the queries and mechanisms supported by APEx, using
Ligett et al.’s methods would be overkill in two ways: (1)
there is an extra privacy cost ϵ0 to test the empirical error,
(2) since the exploration queries are variations of counts,
the sensitivity of the error will be so high that the noise
introduced to the empirical error could limit our ability to
distinguish between different epsilon values. For example,
for a simple counting query of size 1, the maximum privacy
cost required in APEx is ln(1/β)/α while the privacy cost
with Ligett et al. is more than ϵ0 = 16(ln(2T /β))/α . When
APEx applies a data-dependent approach, the privacy cost
can be even smaller than ln(1/β)/α . For a prefix counting
query of size L and sensitivity of L, the best privacy cost
achieved in APEx is O(logL), but ϵ0 in [22] is O(L) as the
sensitivity of the error to the final query answer is L (for
both Laplace and strategy-based mechanisms). Similarly, for
iceberg counting queries (ICQ), the sensitivity of error to the
final query answer is large and results in a large ϵ0 for the
differentially private testing. Thus, using themethod in Ligett
et al. would not help the currently supported mechanisms
and queries inAPEx. In the future, we will add more complex
mechanisms into APEx (like DAWA [25], MWEM [15] that
add data dependent noise) and study whether the methods
of Ligett et al. can be adapted to our setting.
Data cleaning on private data. In our case study, we use
APEx as a means to help tune a cleaning workflow (namely
entity resolution) on private data. Amongst prior work on
cleaning private data [5, 23], the most relevant is Private-
Clean [23] as it uses differential privacy too. However, simi-
larities to APEx stop with that. First, PrivateClean assumes
a different setting, where no active data cleaner is involved.
The data owner perturbs the dirty data without cleaning it,
while the data analyst who wants to obtain some aggregate
queries will clean the perturbed dirty data. Moreover, all the
privacy perturbation techniques in PrivateClean are based
on record-level perturbation, which (1) only work well for at-
tributes with small domain sizes, and (2) has asymptotically
poorer utility for aggregated queries. At last, the randomized
response technique used for sampling string attributes in
PrivateClean does not satisfy differential privacy – it leaks
the active domain of the attribute.
Relationship to Privacy Laws. APEx requires the data
owner to only specify the overall privacy budget B. This
setup may support and realize privacy laws in the future (e.g.
GDPR [2]) to manage the privacy loss of users where B can
be seen as the maximum budget to be spent without asking
users’ consent.
E QUERIES SUPPORTED BY APEX
Besides supporting linear counting queries, our algorithms
in APEx can be easily extended to support SUM() queries.
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Queries for MEDIAN() (and percentile) can be supported
by first querying the CDF (using a WCQ), and finding the
median from that. GROUPBY can be expressed as a sequence
of two queries: first query for values of an attribute with
COUNT(*) > 0 (using ICQ), and then query the noisy counts
for these bins (using WCQ). Similarly, if the aggregated func-
tion f () in HAVING differs from the aggregated function д(),
APEx can express it as a sequence of two queries: first query
for bins having f () > c (using ICQ), and then apply д() on
these bins (using WCQ).
However, no differentially private algorithms can accu-
rately report MAX() and MIN(). Non-linear queries such
as AVG() and STD() can have very sensitive error bounds
to noise when computed on a small number of rows (like
the measures discussed in Section 3.2). Hence, supporting
non-linear queries would need new translation mechanisms.
Moreover, APEx can support queries with foreign key joins
(that do not amplify the contribution of one record), but de-
signing accurate differentially private algorithms for queries
with general joins is still an active area of research.
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